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Abstract
Current telecommunications systems have very
good security architectures that include authentication
and authorization as well as accounting. These three
features enable an edge system to obtain access
into a radio communication network, request specific
Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements and ensure
proper billing for service. Furthermore, the links are
secure. Widely used telecommunication technologies
are Long Term Evolution (LTE) and Worldwide In-
teroperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX)
This paper provides a system-level view of
network-centric operations for the Global Airspace
System (GAS) and the problems and issues with
deploying new technologies into the system. The
paper then focuses on applying the basic security
architectures of commercial telecommunication sys-
tems and deployment of federated Authentication,
Authorization and Accounting systems to provide a
scalable, evolvable reliable and maintainable solution
to enable a globally deployable identity-based secure
airspace system.
Background
The air transportation community is continually
looking to improve the safety and efficiency of the
Global Airspace System (GAS). This community con-
sists of a variety of national and international govern-
ment organizations, airlines, and equipment suppliers
and manufacturers. In general they have the common
goal stated above, but in practice each organiza-
tion has different stakeholders with often conflicting
bottom-line goals. For example: the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and European Organisation for
the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) pri-
mary goal is safety of flight, safety of life. While this
is also a goal of the airlines, they must meet this goal
while remaining profitable. The International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International
Air Transport Association (IATA) cooperate to ensure
interoperability of the GAS. Groups such as NASA
are chartered to develop new technologies directed at
improving the safety and efficiency of the GAS.
The FAA is the national aviation authority of
the United States. It has authority to regulate and
oversee all aspects of American civil aviation. The
FAA’s mission is to provide the safest, most efficient
aerospace system in the world.
EUROCONTROL is the European Organisation
for the Safety of Air Navigation. It is an interna-
tional civil organization working for seamless, pan-
European air traffic management. EUROCONTROL
coordinates and plans air traffic control for all of
Europe.
The International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), is an agency of the United Nations. It codi-
fies the principles and techniques of international air
navigation and fosters the planning and development
of international air transport to ensure safe and orderly
growth.
The International Air Transport Association
(IATA) is a trade association of the world’s airlines
with membership of roughly 260 airlines. IATA’s
mission is to represent, lead and serve the airline
industry. They work in a number of areas including
policy, safety, environmental impact, security and
simplifying business to improve efficiencies and save
money.
In order to improve efficiencies and maintain
safety two major programs have been created – one
in the United States and another one in Europe.
These are the Next Generation Air Transportation
System (NextGen) in the United States and Single
European Sky Air Traffic Management (ATM) Re-
search (SESAR). NextGen is an Air Traffic Control
(ATC) modernization program which uses sophis-
ticated technologies and new flight procedures to
reduce flight delays, flight times and aircraft fuel
burn/emissions. One of the key technologies is Global
Positioning System (GPS). GPS should enable planes
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to fly closer together, take more direct routes and
avoid delays caused by airport “stacking”. SESAR is a
collaborative project to completely overhaul European
airspace and its air traffic management (ATM).
NASA’s Airspace Operations and Safety Pro-
gram (AOSP) creates technologies to help NextGen
fulfill its promise. AOSP works with the FAA, indus-
try and academic partners to conceive and develop
NextGen technologies to improve the intrinsic safety
of current and future aircraft. The Safe Autonomous
Systems Operations (SASO) and Shadow Mode
Assessment Using Realistic Technologies for the
National Airspace System (SMART-NAS) projects
are part of AOSP. SASO identifies and develops
the maximum possible autonomous capabilities. The
SMART-NAS Project will develop an air traffic man-
agement simulation capability to explore integration
of alternative concepts, technologies and architectures
within the National Airspace System. In support of
SMART-NAS, NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC)
is working with NASA Ames Research Center (ARC)
on Networked ATM architectures and technologies.
GRC has a testbed at Cleveland Hopkins Airport to
support this effort with emphasis on surface commu-
nications.
Goals
Looking at all the programs that exist to improve
safety and efficiency in the global airspace system,
one quickly realizes that the keys to success are
network-centric operations and improved situational
awareness. One of the critical enablers is “connected
aircraft”. Connectivity to the aircraft must be secure,
reliable, and manageable globally.
Modernization Issues
Why is it so difficult to get new technologies
deployed in the global airspace system?
Safety
The airline industry has an excellent safety
record. In order to maintain public confidence in air
travel, safety must be the top priority. Thus any new
technologies or any changes to operational procedures
must be proven to at least maintain the current level
of safety if not improve it. This is not an easy matter
and can be rather expensive in terms of both time and
money. As a result, the industry is often looked at as
being reactive rather than proactive.
The “Able” List
Assuming we can get past the safety issues, then
the general problem with deploying new technologies
is that they do not meet all the requirements of what
we coin the “Able List”.
The Able List
• Adaptable
• Affordable
• Deployable
• Evolvable
• Global(able)
• Maintainable
• Manageable
• Reliable
• Scalable
• Securable
Adaptable: A technology that is not adaptable
is not likely to be embraced due to a high probability
of obsolescence.
Affordable: If the greatest technology in the
world is not affordable, it will not be accepted by
the airline industry. Remember, the airlines must
make money to survive. This is one reason satellite
communications is often not embraced. The cost of
the conductivity versus the overall perceived payback
is not considered justified by many.
Deployable: If one has to take an aircraft off-line,
then the airline cannot generate revenue from that
aircraft while the new technology is being integrated.
Thus, integration should be done during normal main-
tenance with little additional out-of-service time.
Evolvable: Technologies must seamlessly inte-
grate into existing systems and any upgrades must be
easy to make. There is no flag day1.
Global(able): Global scalability must be consid-
ered. Airplanes fly from one city to another and from
one country to another. All operations must be smooth
and seamless and be capable of global deployment –
particularly when it comes to security solutions.
1A change which requires a complete restart or conversion
of a sizable body of software or data and requires that updates
be performed almost simultaneously across the entire system or
network. It came into use when a massive change was made to
the Multics time-sharing system to convert from the old ASCII
code to the new one; this was scheduled for Flag Day (a US
holiday), June 14, 1966.
Maintainable: One must easily be able to main-
tain a system once it is deployed.
Manageable: One must be able to easily manage
a system in a cost-effective manner.
Reliable: The system must be reliable – partic-
ularly in the aerospace industry. Reliability affects
safety, maintainability and cost.
Scalable: It is significantly more challenging to
make systems work on a global scale than it is
for small-scale deployment such as confined to an
individual airport. Scalability is hard.
Securable: If one cannot secure the system to the
scale of its intended deployment it is rendered useless.
An Integrated Communication, Naviga-
tion and Surveillance System
Figure 1 illustrates an example of an integrated
communication, navigation and surveillance system
for Aeronautics. Four major entities are shown here:
FAA2, Port Authority, airlines, and Public Internet
and Entertainment Services (PIES). Not shown are
Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs). How UAVs are
handled is a subject for future consideration. These
four entities represent four security domains. Perhaps,
with the exception of PIES, each of these entities
needs to interact and exchange information in order
to provide system-wide situational awareness thereby
enabling each entity to properly manage assets and
resources with the overall goal of maintaining safety
and improving efficiencies.
A fully connected aircraft communicates over a
variety of systems owned and operated by various
entities both public and private. These connections
include High Frequency (HF) for oceanic, Automatic
Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B), Very
High Frequency (VHF) radios, Airport Mobile Ac-
cess Communication System (AeroMACS), Gatelink,
satellite systems such as Inmarsat and Iridium, and
cellular systems.
In order to get a sense deployment relative to
scalability, consider the AeroMACS deployment for
the Port Authority versus AeroMACS deployment for
air traffic control in ATC operations. With regard to
the Port Authority, the AeroMACS system is entirely
controlled by one entity, the Port Authority. Thus, the
2EUROCONTROL or another air traffic management entity
depending on where one is in a global deployment
entire AeroMACS network including all security and
QoS configurations are controlled by the Port Author-
ity. The system does not have to scale beyond the
airport in question. The AeroMACS Authentication,
Authorization and Accounting (AAA) server can be
local and does not have to share any information with
any other systems. However, for the ATC AeroMACS
deployment, the access into the system must scale to
a global level and must handle network layer mobility
as a single aircraft may fly throughout the global
airspace landing at various airports in different coun-
tries. Thus, the aircraft is a system that roams using
multiple service providers and wireless technologies.
Authorization, access and service agreements3 must
be manageable and deployable on a global scale.
Note, there is a similar need for authorization, access,
and service agreements on a global scale for Gatelink,
various satellite systems, cellular systems, and future
wireless systems.
Globally Deployable, Identity-based Se-
cure Airspace System
The remainder of this paper focuses on apply-
ing the basic security architectures of commercial
telecommunication systems to provide an affordable,
scalable, evolvable reliable, maintainable and man-
ageable solution to enable a globally deployable
identity-based secure airspace system.
Issues/Requirements
The following are the system requirements:
1) Seamless Global Access,
2) Seamless Billing,
3) Manageable Service Agreements (e.g. QoS),
4) Scalable Seamless Management,
5) Seamless Roaming, and
6) Single Identity.
In the above requirements, “seamless” implies
machine-to-machine communications without human
intervention. A single identity is the key to enabling
seamless operations.
It is currently unclear how to implement the
requirements above in the GAS. Fortunately, the
telecommunication industry and in particular the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the 3rd
3Quality of Service settings, often which vary depending on
the service provider and wireless technology.
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Figure 1. Integrated Communication, Navigation and Surveillance System
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) have devel-
oped many standards and architectures to address
most of these issues.
What is an Identity?
In this context, an identity is something that can
be used to uniquely identify a system. For aeronautics,
that system is an aircraft. Since the identity will
be used to gain access into an aeronautical network
and for billing, we must be able to authenticate
that identity and ensure it is not spoofed. We also
desire that an identity is usable across multiple access
systems.
In commercial systems there are two basic meth-
ods used to identify a system: Certificates or some
form of serial number such as an electronic serial
number (ESN) or international mobile equipment
identity (IMEI). ESNs and IMEIs are used by the
cell phone industry. One problem with ESNs and
IMEIs is that they are assigned to a specific piece of
hardware making portability an issue. A solution to
this is the Subscriber Identification Module (SIM), an
integrated circuit that securely stores the International
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number and its
related key which are used to identify and authenticate
subscribers on mobile telephony devices. SIM cards
are designed to be transferable between different
mobile devices. If a piece of equipment breaks or is
upgraded, one can simply move the SIM card to the
replacement unit and it becomes operational again.
No reregistration needs to occur.
An identity certificate or digital certificate is an
cryptographic document used to prove ownership of a
public key. The certificate includes information about
the key, information about its owner’s identity, and
the digital signature of an entity that has verified the
certificate’s contents are correct. If the signature is
valid, and the entity examining the certificate trusts
the signer, then they know they can use that key to
communicate with its owner. Identity certificates are
associated with the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
and usually associate with X.509, an International
Telegraph Union - Telecommunication standardiza-
tion sector (ITU-T) standard for a public key infras-
tructure [1][2].
Certificate Management in Aeronautical Sys-
tems
Certificate management is difficult in any system
even a single owner system. Regarding aeronautics,
in order to be scalable, manageable and affordable,
a single identity (a single certificate) is highly de-
sirable. It may be possible to map other certificates
to this single identity in order to utilize that single
identity across multiple systems owned and operated
by different service providers.
In aeronautics systems, various wireless sys-
tems have vastly different bandwidth capabilities.
Likewise, various certificates and keys have vastly
different bandwidth requirements. Harmonizing these
is a challenge. The FAA sponsored a report on
AeroMACS privacy key management [3]. Within this
report it was determined that specifying the opera-
tion of Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
(AAA) capabilities was out-of-scope. It was agreed
that the Minimum Operational Performance Specifi-
cation (MOPS) should address the air interface be-
tween the subscriber station and the base station with
some material to address interoperability with AAA
sites (e.g., an interoperable certificate profile). How-
ever, Key management and synchronization across all
AAA sites was determined to be a ground AeroMACS
deployment issue. Some important points from this
document follow:
• Key pairs and the corresponding certificates for
airborne users are associated with a given air-
frame, and not, for example, with a pilot or a
particular flight identifier. In addition, key pairs
and certificates are not assigned to individual
pieces of equipment on an airframe.
• ICAO Doc 9880 Part IVB specifies a Certificate
Authority (CA) architecture in which each State
operates (or contracts with an entity to operate on
its behalf) a root-level CA. These State CAs have
a non-transitive peer relationship amongst one
another rather than a hierarchical relationship.
The relationship among such CAs is expected to
be established and maintained through bilateral
and/or multilateral agreements, which includes,
for example, provision for cross-certification.
• Harmonization amongst the AeroMACS and
Aeronautical Telecommunication Network
(ATN) based security solutions is to minimize
the cryptographic infrastructure implemented
on an airframe. Harmonizing these solutions
will allow airframe and avionics manufacturers
to use common toolsets to provide security
services for multiple applications. The areas of
harmonization are the underlying cryptographic
settings, certificate content, and CA architecture.
• Provisioning must occur across ATN Open
System Interconnection (OSI) Security,
ATN Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) Security,
Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated (ARINC) 823,
WiMAX and AeroMACS
Quality of Service
Quality of service (QoS) is the overall perfor-
mance of a service as seen by the users of the
network. QoS has numerous characteristics including
error rates, bit rate, throughput, transmission delay,
availability, and jitter. Different services require dif-
ferent QoS. For example, voice may be able to with-
stand a high error rate but requires low transmission
delay whereas a file transfer may require relatively
low error rates but can withstand jitter, transmission
delay, and operate over a variety of bit rates. Video
may require low error rates, low jitter, and high bit
rate. The specification of QoS service parameters is
known as a service flow. Per service flow QoS is the
ability to identify a traffic flow and enable rules on
how that specific flow should be treated including how
the flow should behave when forwarded with other
traffic flows.
In order to be scalable and manageable, one
must be able to specify QoS for a particular entity
globally. The QoS specifications are likely to vary
per link type (e.g. AeroMAX, Gatelink, Satellite,
4G/5D), but should not vary per service provider for
any particular link type. This implies some type of
roaming agreements between service providers for
any particular link type.
System Access and QoS Provisioning
In order to understand concepts of system access
and QoS provisioning, we will examine two existing
systems: Gatelink4 and LTE.
System Access
First, we will summarize the Gatelink access
methodology as described in the ARINC specification
822 [4] illustrated in figure 2 When the aircraft
is in range of the airport Access Point (AP), the
aircraft client will scan for available APs. Once the
Radio Frequency (RF) association has completed, the
aircraft will initiate an authentication session with the
airport AP based on the registered aircraft (Terminal
Wireless LAN Functions (TWLF)) and the AAA
server. That server could be at the airport, or at the
airline under the Network Administrator’s control as
shown in figure 2. For global scalability, the AAA
server should be at the airline in which case, the
AP would also need a Remote Authentication Dial-
In User Service (RADIUS) proxy capability5. Proxy
service enables a RADIUS/AAA server to forward
an authentication request from a local server to a
remote RADIUS server and return the remote server’s
reply to the local server. In this way, client/server
architecture is established between local and remote
servers in effect, extending the wireless link from the
aircraft to the airline’s network.
An X.509 certificate is used to gain access to
the system6. The X.509 certificate must be signed
by a valid certificate authority and must be installed
on each Gatelink client (aircraft). The AAA server
will acknowledge or deny the signature of the root
authority or will forward the authentication requests
to the airline or some authorized third party RADIUS
server via proxy depending on the agreement with the
airline. The remote RADIUS server will acknowledge
or deny the request.
If the accessing system (or user) is not in the
local RADIUS server configurations, the server will
look for a realm name and pass the authentication
4We use the Gatelink illustration as Gatelink does not require
and QoS management and is therefore a simpler example.
5There needs to be a method of securing the proxy transaction
between the airport and airline, because the current RADIUS
proxy protocol is not secure.
6It is highly desirable to have one certificate for Gatelink,
AeroMACS, WiMAX, Satellite Communications (SATCOM),
LTE, etc. in order to scale globally and be manageable.
request to a remote RADIUS server which is mapped
via manual configuration to the realm name.
The Access System (User-Name) RADIUS at-
tribute is a character string that typically contains
the accessing system account’s location (called the
realm) and the accessing system account’s name. The
realm is synonymous with the concept of domain,
including Domain Name System (DNS) domains
and Active Directory R© domains. For example, in
the URL http://www.ABCXYZ.com/index.html, the
domain name is ABCXYZ.com. which is also the
realm name.
Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) may
be included in certificates and Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRLs) in the subjectAltName and issuerAlt-
Name extensions, name constraints extension, author-
ity information access extension, subject information
access extension, CRL distribution points extension,
and issuing distribution point extension [5].
Realm names are configured in connection re-
quest policies while designing and deploying the
RADIUS infrastructure to ensure that connection
requests are routed from RADIUS network access
servers (AAA airport server in figure 2), to remote
distributed RADIUS servers (Airline Network AAA
server) that can authenticate and authorize the con-
nection request.
Decentralizing AAA has multiple problems that
must be considered. These problems mainly relate
to user account integrity, user profile management,
failover mechanisms, and AAA interworking for
roaming users [6]. Other considerations for connected
aircraft are acquisition time (the time it takes to get
authorization, QoS parameters and IP connectivity to
remote AAA systems).
Multi-Domain System Access
Figure 3 is from a Cisco White paper, Archi-
tecture for Mobile Data Offload over Wireless Fi-
delity (Wi-Fi) Access Networks [7]. This illustrates
the relationship between a Third Generation (3G)
Radio Access Network (RAN), an LTE RAN service
provider and a cooperating Wi-Fi service provider.
When a system wishes to connect to the Wi-Fi RAN,
authentication can be setup such that the AAA server
at the Wi-Fi Internet Service Provider (ISP) proxies
to the 3G/LTE Service Provider (SP) network access
system. This allows a non-3GPP Internet Protocol (IP)
Figure 2. Gatelink Network Architecture Recommendations and Concept of Operations [4]
access into the 3G Mobile Packet Core (MPC). Note,
the Policy and Change Control (PCC) is managed by
the 3G/LTE Service Provider. The PCC is where QoS
is managed in the 3GPP network architecture.
To control subscriber access to Wi-Fi networks,
multiple authentication methods can be used. In a
typical modern Wi-Fi network, two types of au-
thentication are available. The first method, por-
tal based authentication, targets customers without
a permanent contract with the operator (vouchers,
time-limited access,Short Message Service (SMS)
payments, etc.). Alternatively, Extensible Authentica-
tion Protocol (EAP) authentication provides transpar-
ent and easy access for the subscribers with SIM
cards or certificates7. EAP-based authentication al-
7EAP authentication would be use for aeronautics.
lows transparent authentication and secure commu-
nication without interaction from the subscriber (only
initial configuration of the Service Set ID (SSID)
which, for Gatelink, is predefined and configured in
the TWLF [4].
For an aeronautic global network, visualize the
Wi-Fi access as Gatelink, the 3G as AeroMACS and
LTE as a future wireless access.
QoS Provisioning
For all practical purposes, an aircraft could be
considered constantly roaming across multiple wire-
less networks owned and operated by multiple enti-
ties. How one manages QoS over such a diverse net-
work is an interesting challenge. Fortunately, it is not
unique to the aeronautics industry. The commercial
telecommunication and ISPs have had to address this
Figure 3. Multi-Domain System Access [7]
exact problem.
Figure 4, PCC reference architecture for fixed
Broadband Access Interworking (visited access), il-
lustrates how QoS and policy is provisioned in a
roaming system for a 3GPP network. Regarding
QoS provisioning, the important interface is the S9
reference point. “S9 resides between a Policy and
Charging Rules Function (PCRF) in the Public Land
Mobile Network (PLMN) Home PLMN (H-PLMN)
(H-PCRF) and a PCRF in the Visiting PLMN
(V-PLMN) (V-PCRF). For roaming with a visited
access, this interface reference enables the Home
PCRF (H-PCRF) to:
• Have dynamic PCC control, including the Policy
and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF)
and, if applicable, Bearer Binding and Event
Reporting Function (BBERF), and, if applica-
ble, Traffic Detection Function (TDF), in the
V-PLMN;
• Deliver or receive IP Connectivity Access Net-
work (CAN) specific parameters from both
the PCEF and, if applicable, BBERF, in the
V-PLMN;
• Serve recieve authorizations and event subscrip-
tions from an Application Function (AF) in the
V-PLMN;
• Receive application identifier, service data flow
descriptions, if available, application instance
identifiers, if available, and application detection
start/stop event triggers report.
For roaming with a home routed access, the S9
interface enables the H-PCRF to provide dynamic
QoS control policies from the H-PLMN, via a Visiting
PCRF (V-PCRF), to a BBERF in the V-PLMN [8].”
The LTE PCC functions include:
• Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF)
The PCRF provides policy control and flow
based charging control decisions.
• Policy and Charging Enforcement Function
(PCEF) The PCEF is implemented in the serv-
ing gateway, this enforces gating and QoS for
individual IP flows on behalf of the PCRF.
It also provides usage measurement to support
charging.
• Online Charging System (OCS) The OCS
provides credit management and grants credit
to the PCEF based on time, traffic volume or
chargeable events.
• Off-line Charging System (OFCS) The OFCS
receives events from the PCEF and generates
Charging Data Records (CDR) for the billing
system.
The WiMAX Policy and Change Control archi-
tecture is very similar to 3GPP as shown if figure 5.
The Access Service Network (ASN) in WiMAX maps
to the RAN in 3GPP while the interface between the
Visiting Connection Service Network (CSN) (vCSN)
and Home CSN (hCSN) is nearly equivalent to inter-
face reference point S9 in figure 4.
WiMAX8 and 3GPP LTE have been designed
with different QoS frameworks and means to en-
able QoS support for evolving Internet applications.
Network initiated or client initiated QoS are both
supported in IEEE 802.16e/IEEE 802.16m systems.
Both operator managed service and unmanaged ser-
vice can be supported. This flexible architecture gives
the mobile client opportunities for differentiation. In
contrast, LTE only supports network initiated QoS
control [10].
LTE QoS
3rd Generation Partnership Project LTE have
been designed with a QoS framework to support
QoS of evolving Internet applications. LTE of-
fers two types of bearers (classes): Guaranteed Bit
Rate (GBR) and non-Guaranteed Bit Rate. GBR
is similar to Unsolicited Grant Service (UGS) in
8Note, AeroMACS is a tailored instance of WiMAX and
uses the same architecture and protocols. As such, AeroMACS
implements QoS management in the same manner as WiMAX.
Figure 4. PCC Reference architecture for Fixed Broadband Access Interworking (visited access) [8]
WiMAX/AeroMACS. Resources related to a GBR
value associated with the bearer are permanently
allocated when a bearer becomes established or mod-
ified. A non-GBR bearer is the default bearer. A
service utilizing a non-GBR bearer may experience
congestion-related packet loss [11].
“The QoS level of granularity in the LTE
Evolved Packet System (EPS) is a packet
flow established between the packet data
network gateway and the user terminal, the
bearer channel. The traffic running between
a particular client application and a service
can be differentiated into separate Service
Data Flows (SDFs). SDFs mapped to the
same bearer channel receive a common QoS
treatment (e.g., scheduling policy, queue
management policy, rate shaping policy,
Radio Link Control (RLC) configuration).
Each SDF is associated with one and only
one QoS Class Identifier (QCI). For the
same IP CAN session, multiple SDFs with
the same QCI and Allocation and Reten-
tion Priority (ARP) can be treated as a
single traffic aggregate which is referred
to as an SDF aggregate. Each QCI maps
to specific applications. QCI characteristics
describe the packet forwarding treatment
that an SDF aggregate receives edge-to-
edge between the User Equipment (UE)
and the PCEF in terms of the following
performance characteristics:
1) Resource Type (GBR or Non-GBR);
Figure 5. WiMAX Policy Control architecture – roaming scenario with HA in the home network [9]
2) Priority;
3) Packet Delay Budget;
4) Packet Error Loss Rate [10].”
“The Policy and Change Control (PCC)
function in LTE networks brings together
and enhances capabilities from earlier 3GPP
releases to deliver dynamic control of policy
and charging on a per subscriber and per IP
flow basis. The LTE Evolved Packet Core
(EPC) includes a PCC architecture that
provides support for fine-grained QoS and
enables application servers to dynamically
control the QoS and charging requirements
of the services they deliver. It also provides
improved support for roaming. Dynamic
control over QoS and charging will help
operators monetize their LTE investment
by providing customers with a variety of
QoS and charging options when choosing a
service [12].”
WiMAX QoS
Five types of scheduling services have been
defined for the WiMAX airlink corresponding to the
traffic characteristics of different services:
• Unsolicited Grant Service (UGS),
• real-time Polling Service (rtPS),
• non-real-time Polling Service (nrtPS),
• extended-real-time Polling Service (ertPS) and
• Best Effort (BE).
UGS, rtPS and ertPS are mainly used for real-time
traffic and interactive traffic such as Voice-Over-IP
(VoIP), video and online gaming, while nrtPS and
BE are usually utilized for non-real-time traffic such
as file transfers, emails, and web browsing.
Each service class has a myriad of QoS pa-
rameters associated with uplink/downlink scheduling
for a service flow (e.g. Maximum sustained rate,
Maximum reserved traffic rate, Maximum latency,
Jitter tolerance, Packet loss, throughput) [13].
Traffic classification and mapping from applica-
tion packets onto Service Flows (SFs) in WiMAX is
done at the convergence sublayer (CS). Classification
is often done using a five-tuple, such as source and
destination IP addresses, source and destination port
address, protocol, and Differentiated Services Code
Point (DSCP) [14].
During the creation of a SF, the CS that the
connection will use is defined. Possible choices of
CS are No CS, Packet IPv4, Packet IPv6, Packet
802.3/Ethernet, Packet 802.1Q VLAN9, Packet IPv4
over 802.3/Ethernet, Packet IPv6 over 802.3/ Ether-
net, Packet IPv4 over 802.1Q VLAN, Packet IPv6
over 802.1Q VLAN and Asynchronous Transfer
Mode [10].
Initial Network Access Example for WiMAX
To clarify and simplify understanding of net-
work access, a simple WiMAX example is provided.
Figure 6 shows the reference architecture for pro-
viding service to a roaming Mobile Station (MS)
with usage of the Home Agent (HA) in the visited
CSN. Authentication, authorization as well as policy
information (the QoS profile) is provided from the
home CSN to the visited CSN over the reference point
R5. Accounting information is forwarded from the
visited CSN to the home CSN over R5, and access
to services in the home CSN may also be provided
over R5 whereas Internet access is usually established
directly out of the visited CSN. Note, it is possible
and a valid configuration to be roaming with the
HA located in the home Network Service Provider
(NSP) [15].
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
(AAA) Servers
The AAA server, QoS management, the Policy
Function (PF) and Policy and Change Control (PCC)
are key elements of any of the modern telecom-
munication architectures. These functions are often
performed using a Remote Authentication Dial-In
User Service (RADIUS) [16] or Diameter [17] server.
The RADIUS protocol carries authentication,
authorization and configuration information between
a Network Access Server (NAS) and a RADIUS au-
thentication server. Requests and responses carried by
the RADIUS protocol are called RADIUS attributes.
These attributes can be username, Service-Type, and
so on. These attributes provide the information needed
by a RADIUS server to authenticate users and to
establish authorized network service for them. The
RADIUS protocol also carries accounting informa-
tion between a NAS and a RADIUS accounting
server [18].
9IEEE 802.1Q standard defines a system of tagging for Ethernet
frames and the accompanying procedures to be used by bridges
and switches in handling such frames. The standard also contains
provisions for a quality of service prioritization scheme.
The RADIUS-Based Policing feature enables
the PCEF in the access network to make automatic
changes to the policing rate of specific sessions and
services. Policies can be based on any attribute in a
request or response, include checking both the exis-
tence of (or lack of) an attribute, and the contents of
an attribute. They can filter out attributes, or re-write
the contents of attributes. Attributes can be created,
deleted, or edited in a policy. Policies can leverage
information in Structured Query Language (SQL),
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), flat-
text files, or any other source of data. Policies can
be based on identities (user, group, or role), location
(client IP, port, etc.), time (date, time of day), authen-
tication method (Password Authentication Protocol
(PAP), Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol
(CHAP), EAP type, etc.), or any other piece of
information that is in a RADIUS packet or in a
database. Policies can enforce Virtual Local Area
Network (VLAN) capabilities, filtering QoS, etc. [19].
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
(AAA) protocols such as RADIUS were initially
deployed to provide dial-up Point-to-Point Protocol
(PPP) and terminal server access. Over time, AAA
support was needed on many new access technologies
as the scale and complexity of AAA networks grew.
AAA was also used on new applications (such as
VoIP). This led to new demands on AAA protocols.
As a result, Diameter10 was developed – evolving
from and replacing the much less capable RADIUS
protocol. Diameter is not directly backwards compat-
ible but provides an upgrade path for RADIUS.
The new network access requirements for AAA
protocols addressed by Diameter are summarized
below.
• Failover
• Transmission-level security – RADIUS support
for IPsec is not required.
• Reliable transport – RADIUS runs over UDP,
and does not define retransmission behavior; as
a result, reliability varies between implementa-
tions.
• Agent support – RADIUS does not provide for
explicit support for agents, including proxies,
redirects, and relays. Since the expected behavior
10The name is a play on words, derived from the RADIUS
protocol. A diameter is twice the radius.
Figure 6. WiMAX Roaming with HA located in the visited NSP [15]
is not defined, it varies between implementa-
tions.
• Server-initiated messages
• Transition support – Considerable effort has been
expended in enabling backward compatibility
with RADIUS so that the two protocols may be
deployed in the same network.
• Capability negotiation
• Peer discovery and configuration – RADIUS
implementations typically require that the name
or address of servers or clients be manually
configured, along with the corresponding shared
secrets. This results in a large administrative
burden and creates the temptation to reuse the
RADIUS shared secret, which can result in ma-
jor security vulnerabilities if the Request Au-
thenticator is not globally and temporally unique
as required in RFC2665 [16].
Over time, the capabilities of Network Access
Server (NAS) devices have increased substantially.
As a result, Diameter is a considerably more sophis-
ticated protocol than RADIUS Through the use of
extensions, the protocol was designed to be extensible
to support proxies, brokers, strong security, mobile
IP, network-access servers, accounting and resource
management.
Summary
In order to globally deploy new communications
technologies into the Global Airspace System (GAS)
those technologies must meet all the requirements
of the “Able List”. The GAS currently consists of
a variety of communications links, often quite old
such as VHF analog radios with limited bandwidth
capability. New technologies such as Gatelink and
AeroMACS offer greater capability, greater band-
width, better security and potential cost savings.
However, these systems will not be deployed if the
cost of deployment and management outweighs the
benefits. Identity-based security with single certificate
sign-on for system access along with the capability
of managing QoS policy for diverse systems in a
centralized location has the potential to ensure a
smooth, evolvable, scalable, manageable, affordable
deployment. Modern telecommunications networks
have shown this to be possible for single communi-
cation technologies types (e.g. LTE and WiMAX). In
addition the tools, protocols and architectures exist.
The outstanding question remains: “Can a single
identity and centralized QoS policy management be
deployed that encompasses multiple Access Service
Networks and Network Service Providers to enable
connected aircraft?”
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